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agreements and the issuance of orders, limiting or allotting the amounts of
certain agricultural commodities other than milk that may be purchased,
handled, or shipped by each handler in interstate or foreign commerce, and
by fixing the minimum prices to be paid by handlers to producers of milk,
to establish and maintain such orderly marketing conditions for such com-
modities in interstate commerce as will give such commodities a purchasing
power with respect to articles that farmers buy, equivalent to the purchasing
power of such commodities in the base period described in the Act. AAA.
37. Act of September 1, 1937, 50 Stat. 903, (1939) 7 U. S. C. A. sec.
1100 (Sugar Act of 1937): To regulate sugar marketings in interstate and
foreign commerce by the imposition of quotas on the continental United
States, the off-shore possessions, the Commonwealth of the Philippine Is-
lands, and foreign countries. SD.
38. Title III of the Act of July 22, 1937, 50 Stat. 525, (1939) 7 U. S.
C. A. sec. 1010 (Bankhead-Jones Farm Tenant Act): to authorize the Sec-
retary to regulate the use and occupancy of submarginal lands and lands
not primarily suitable for cultivation acquired by, or transferred to, the
Secretary for the effectuation of the land conservation and land utilization
programs prescribed by the Act. SCS.
39. Act of February 16, 1938, 52 Stat. 31, 45 (1939) 7 U. S. C. A. sec.
1311 (Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938): in subtitle B, Title III, to
establish marketing quotas for commercial producers of tobacco, corn,
wheat, cotton, and rice whenever the Secretary finds that the total supply
of any such commodity exceeds a certain level specified in the Act; and
provided that more than one-third of the farmers subject to such quotas
and voting in a referendum do not oppose the quotas. AAA.
40. Act of August 9, 1939, 53 Stat. 1275, (1939 Supp.) 7 U. S. C. A.
see. 1551 (Federal Seed Act) : to regulate interstate and foreign commerce
in seeds; to require labeling and to prohibit misrepresentation of seeds in
interstate commerce; and to require certain standards with respect to cer-
tain imported seeds. AMS.
DISCUSSION
by JOHN B. GAGEt
Remarks of previous speakers have had to do with the Morgan
case. That case now runs so far back in history that even I
would be unable to tell you how many times it had been argued.
It looks as though it may, when finally disposed of, have been
productive of more opinions of the Supreme Court than any
other case that has come before that Court-four already, and
yet it goes on. The fact that it still stands, and that I am still of
counsel in the case, and still living after all the time that has
elapsed, leads me to say that I am a little reluctant to discuss,
- Iember of Kansas City, Missouri,.Bar.
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otherwise than in the forum provided for its decision, the details
of that case.
However, I do want to mention one thing. Mr. Sellers has
performed a signal service here, I think, in outlining to you the
vast range of the regulatory activities of the Department of
Agriculture. They extend from control of the humble hivers of
bees, growers of bull frogs, and ordinary farmers, clear up to
the greatest corporations in the land, such as the packers with
larger annual cash turnover than any other industry. They in-
clude authority in the Secretary of Agriculture to determine
what is in the public interest in this vast field, to ascertain what
is public convenience and necessity in the granting of licenses,
to declare what are unfair practices in the agricultural market-
ing industry, handling the products of our tremendous farming
operations, and to prevent those practices which he deems unfair.
Now, that is a vast range of authority. When legislatures or
parliaments have met in the past, what have they been doing?
They have been trying to define what was unfair practice on the
part of the individuals that compose the body politic. A day has
apparently come about when our economic and social order has
become so complex that these practices can no longer be defi-
nitely defined by direct legislative action. The legislatures must
pass that function on to experts in the particular fields. The day
has apparently also come when the adjudications that must re-
sult after those legislative determinations are made must be made
not by juries drawn from the body of the people, as in the past,
but by experts in the particular matters coming up for adjudica-
tion. Let us grant that that is the situation.
We have yet to consider, and that is the subject Mr. Sellers
has been discussing, what shall be the procedure involved in the
making of these determinations of such vast scope and tremen-
dous consequences, whether they be legislative, i. e., looking to
the future, or adjudicative, i. e., determining past or existing
facts and declaring the law in its application to the individual
case.
It is one thing to say, well you should have a body of chosen
experts to pass upon matters. It is another thing to say how
those experts should proceed in making the determinations,
either legislative or adjudicative, which this situation calls upon
and demands. Shall we have in their deliberations any of the old
1940]
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol25/iss3/21
386 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 25
safeguards leading to judicial objectivism that have character-
ized judicial determinations in the past, and if we must have
some of them, how many of them shall we have?
Now, it was Mr. Justice Frankfurter who said, in a meeting
somewhat of this kind several years ago:
Remember, there are very precious values of civilization
which ultimately, to a large extent, are procedural in their
nature. * * * All tribunals, administrative or judicial, have
to enquire and examine before they decide. Historic experi-
ence lies behind the right to a day in court, and a full day.
Mr. Sellers has performed another service. He has sought to
clarify the issues, as he said, by delimitation, by elimination, by a
classification between regulatory and non-regulatory activities.
I would suggest another thought. The very term "administrative
law" leads to a confusion of thought. "Ad minister" in Latin is
related to the performance of the old ministerial duties of gov-
ernment, to the exercise of governmental power, proprietary in
character, including the control of public services such as the
post office or this seed distribution that Mr. Sellers mentioned.
In these fields government controls its own property or the per-
formance of its own purely governmental functions.
Now, I do not see, particularly, why the government in the
exercise of these proprietary functions, as for example, when it
leases public land or sells it, is any more required to give notice
and hearing to the parties to be affected thereby than any other
owner, public or private. That is, the private owner of property
when he sells or leases lands is not compelled to conduct a hearing
and the government in the expenditure of public funds is not
required to do so. We are spending public money in various and
diversified ways in recent years. The farmer voluntarily agrees
to limit his acreage of certain crops to comply with certain soil
conservation practices in order to get public money. It is his
voluntary act. There may be reasons of policy rather than of
law why a hearing should be accorded, but the rules could well
be different from what they would be in other instances where
hearing is required as a matter of law.
There is a different situation presented when we read in the
packers and stockyards case of rate regulation, where the De-
partment of Agriculture fixes upon a hypothetical basis a maxi-
mum return to the livestock salesman, provided he reaches a
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certain standard of selling performance. Such powers are com-
pulsory, regulatory, dealing with somebody else's livelihood and
business.
And so, let us cast out from our thoughts for the time being
in our consideration of this subject the ministerial, proprietary
activities of government. It may be that in matters arising in
the Post Office Department, or many of them, notice and hearing
should be had before they are disposed of. But that is not be-
cause of any elementary rule of law. It has nothing to do with
the supremacy of the law, so to speak.
Having said that, we approach the regulatory activities aris-
ing, as Mr. Sellers says, under forty varying acts. Now let's
stop to think. The Supreme Court says that they who decide
must hear. It also in its first opinion in the Morgan case said
that where under the law it was given only unto the Secretary
himself to decide a matter, that might result in the imposition
of an onerous duty upon him. When you think of these forty
acts and all the other manifold duties of the Secretary, you see
what a situation has arisen. In the Morgan case it was shown
that in a prior proceeding under the Act a delegation of power
had been arrived at by agreement with the respondents and the
rates in question in the Morgan case were fixed by delegates of
the Secretary, he finally approving the order. The rates so de-
termined were changed by an order made by subordinates with-
out agreement as in the first instance. Therefore, the situation
in the Morgan case was that the Secretary both by the law and
by the recognized practice was called upon to decide and hence
he was called upon to hear. Now, hear in what manner? Not
necessarily to listen to the witnesses' testimony, not necessarily
to read all the evidence, but by reading fair analyses and sum-
maries of evidence or reading the parts of the record related to
the controverted issues. The opinion required him who was to
decide to become familiar with the case.
Now, is that necessary? Or is it unnecessary? That was one
of the questions.
Let us go further into this regulatory side, this non-proprie-
tary side of governmental control. One of the functions being
carried on is that of rule-making, a function legislative in char-
acter. I think we can understand these things better, perhaps,
by taking concrete cases. Here is an actual case. We will take
19401
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one under the Packers and Stockyards Act. A shipper of live-
stock in a country town in Missouri a year ago draws a draft
on a market agency at Kansas City. The market agency accepted
that draft on that occasion, the cattle coming in being worth the
amount for which it was drawn. A year later the same man
draws another draft, negotiable in form, on the same market
agency. He uses that draft in payment for cattle which he buys
in a Missouri town from a farmer. The agency refuses to accept
the draft, refuses to sell the cattle. Their value is less than the
amount of the draft. The draft is dishonored. The original
vendor, the farmer, recovers the cattle and refuses to take the
offered market price for them. He then files a complaint with
the Secretary of Agriculture charging an unfair practice on the
part of the market agency in refusing to accept the draft.
Reparation is allowed.
We have a Negotiable Instruments Act that requires a written
acceptance on every instrument. But reparation is based on an
unfair practice involved, a matter purely legislative. It covers a
question that would otherwise be determined by law and pro-
cedure already existing. The law merchant, as I recall it, first
was written into the laws of England by judicial decision, later
covered by parliamentary act, but it was the custom of merchants
that had already been well established before it was recognized
either judicially or legislatively. Here we have a new process set
up for changing the law so established.
Here is another case. This time under the Perishable Com-
modities Act. Lettuce moves from California to Kansas City. A
contract is entered into between a producer of lettuce in Cali-
fornia and a dealer in Kansas City which provides for the ship-
ment of lettuce f. o. b. Kansas City, subject to the inspection
upon arrival by the buyer, the Kansas City dealer. The dealer
declines on inspection to accept the lettuce. A complaint charg-
ing an unfair practice is filed against the dealer. An order issues
that he make reparation and pay the damage representing the
difference in the price he contracted to pay and the price that
the farmer in California received for the lettuce from someone
else. The theory is that the contract for inspection on arrival is
an unfair practice and against the policy of the Act.
The important question is, should that character of unfair
practice, if it be an unfair practice, if it be within the authority
Washington University Open Scholarship
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of the Secretary so to declare, be first determined by rule or
should it be declared through a method of law-making employed
adjudicatively in the individual case after the event has oc-
curred? What should be the character of notice to affected par-
ties? What should be the character of hearing provided before
such a law or implementation of existing law is to govern trans-
actions in lettuce?
Here we are dealing with matters that are of judicial cog-
nizance and which would be determinable in ordinary courts. I
could give you case after case of that sort which would emphasize
the importance of the questions and illustrate the problems in-
volved. If very precious values of civilization rest on procedure,
we can see how important it is to provide correct procedure, fair
hearing, notice and not to permit anonymous decisions.
Mr. Sellers was discussing present practice in the Department.
We talk about experts. Here are two examples. One man in the
Department of Agriculture may today be prosecuting a case in
which an associate is sitting as an examiner. The reverse of the
situation may be true on the next day. These examiners are not
themselves the experts. The experts are in the Bureau of Ani-
mal Industry, or some other Bureau, who study matters of the
sort involved continuously. Should not those experts, if placed
upon a fact-finding board, be given some permanency in the
positions they occupy? Vital determinations they are going to
make that spell livelihood or lack of livelihood to men who have
long been engaged in business. I think it was Alexander Hamil-
ton in the Constitutional Convention, when he discussed giving
federal judges a tenure "during good behavior," who said that
this was the Ark of the Covenant that protected the impartiality
and independence of the judiciary.
Does anything like that, or should it, enter into this adminis-
trative procedure? Or should the personnel change from day to
day, from the prosecuting side of the picture to the adjudicative
side? I think that you can readily see the significance and, per-
haps, recognize a certain inadequacy in the Act to reform ad-
ministrative procedure that is pending, that has passed the
Senate, which Mr. Sellers has referred to. Even if men could be
appointed and designated by the Secretary to exercise his author-
ity, whether they be one or two, they could not supplant these
examiners or take the place of the experts in digging into the
19401
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* facts in individual cases. The vast range of authority which is
how delegated to the Secretary could not be handled by any one
or two men. The priceless condition of judicial objectivity such
as has been built up by the historic experience of the past in the
administration of courts would not necessarily exist under the
plan proposed. That must go without saying.
One of my colleagues has said, "About all we can do here in
this discussion is to vote, to express a vote, not to discuss it." I
would like to go on in detail and cover the field more thoroughly.
What do I think about it from such experience as I have had with
three or four of these acts-milk proceedings under the Market-
ing Act, perishable commodity proceedings, packers and stock-
yards regulations? In each there is rule-making, legislative ac-
tion, as well as adjudicative action. If you are making a general
rule to be applicable to all like circumstances in a given industry
in implementation of an act, I am not so sure that any definite
formal hearing should precede it. A regulation of this sort
really is a product of the knowledge and experience of the
Bureau that makes it. It is a purely legislative act, operating
in futuro. It should be formulated by experts using their own
methods. Of course, they are advantaged if they consult the peo-
ple to be affected. Sometimes inaction is as dangerous as action.
Take this illustration. A group of us, representing ninety-
eight per cent of the cooperative and non-cooperative livestock
market agencies of the country engaged in selling livestock on
public markets, went to the Secretary of Agriculture and pro-
posed certain rules relating to unfair practices on these public
markets. On these markets are exchanges, which, commonly, by
general practice and their own rule, obliterate the statute of
frauds as applied to transactions of sale. They have to do it to
sell at the crack of the whip; the spoken voice may consummate
the sale of personal property involving thousands of dollars.
They asked the Secretary to declare it would be an unfair prac-
tice for any market agency to refuse to respect such an agree-
ment. Other long established rules were suggested. He refused
to make the rules, although on the other side of the picture as to
the packers, rules were made forbidding the giving of secret
discounts to dealers in connection with the sale of meat products.
I believe our agencies were damaged by the refusal to make
these rules, under all the circumstances. But there is a question,
Washington University Open Scholarship
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at least, whether these rules should be, or should not be, made
after public hearing. Maybe they should. They are of enormous
consequence.
Legislatures have adopted the practice, as you know, of having
hearings before committees, formal and informal, and then act-
ing. In England administrative rules go back to Parliament for
approval or disapproval before they become effective, just as
the rules of federal courts went back to our Congress or were
reviewed by Congress for a certain given period before they were
allowed to become effective. Maybe that is the best course to pur-
sue. Perhaps that is the solution, supplemented by some degree
of court review to determine whether the regulations are within
or without the authority of the act under which they issue, or
are unconstitutional.
But you pass to a different field when you come to adjudicative
procedure. Where a function is purely adjudicative it may be
carried out by experts. But we should place those experts in
the situation that you would place a jury, using their expert
knowledge upon testimony in the record before them, and that
alone, and make the record available to all parties. Remember
that in many adjudications important interests are at stake.
Take the Federal Communications Commission. Here is an appli-
cation for a license to a broadcasting station. The applicant is a
little fellow in a big town; and here is a great big newspaper in
the city whose interests will be stepped on if that license be
granted. Vast forces play back and forth to influence those who,
are charged with the exercise of the discretion. The same thing
is true under the Packers and Stockyards Act. Here are the
packers over here, buying the livestock, well organized, heavily
financed. Nothing can serve their purpose better than to have
inefficient selling by the market agencies. The experts who de-
cide such questions, it seems to me, should be placed in such a
position that by tenure of position, by character of personnel, by
the procedure in the execution of the great adjudicative authority
given to them, they are kept aloof, kept independent, and are in
a position to be impartial.
We can draw, as is indicated here, not in the way we draw
juries by lot from the body of the people to decide these things,
but upon our experience in the past in building up those safe-
guards that will result in impartiality of determination and im-
19401
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol25/iss3/21
:392 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 25
partiality of decision. I think that is the process in which we
are now engaged, and we don't care, as lawyers, whether it be
laymen or lawyers who sit on these Boards, if they be impartial
-we, indeed, prefer that they be experts. But we are greatly
concerned as to whether they are given an opportunity fairly to
utilize the expert judgment which they should possess in the
light of the evidence in the record which we know about. To let
somebody who knows nothing about it overrule their opinions
creates another condition that is dangerous in the extreme to the
cause of justice. This is true because policy, as Mr. Justice
Hughes pointed out, may overcome fact and experience.
I don't think, when you properly classify the subjects you are
-dealing with and distinguish between the legislative act and the
adjudicative act, that there is going to be such great difficulty in
charting a sound course. People want to be fair and to set up
necessary standards and safeguards. As we go forward we will
find that the administrative process, if we want to call it that,
when bottomed on sound procedure, will run truer and smoother
and with less impediments to its proper exercise than would be
possible under any other system that lacks these procedural re-
quirements that I know anything about.
by RALPH R. NEUHOFFi
I want to second the compliment to Mr. Sellers for his most
clear presentation of an unclear subject. From a logical stand-
point, if I may talk that plainly, I think that the procedural
situation which he outlined is a mess, and perhaps off the plat-
form our previous speaker would agree with that. Now, I don't
believe the Department of Agriculture will countenance that as
a permanent condition. And I want to see if I can give a little
contribution toward solving that mess.
It seems to me that comparing, as the chairman said I would
,do, my experience in dealing with the Treasury Department with
that in dealing with the Department of Agriculture, where a
ruling is made in the Treasury Department it affects so many
people that if you tell an affected person that there need be no
hearing and that his remedy is political, that is quite satisfactory
to him, because he would have plenty of help in getting a political
t Lecturer in Law, Washington University.
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remedy. On the other hand, if you take a ruling of the Secretary
of Agriculture, which may be general in scope, but as a matter
of fact affects so few people that when all of the people affected
by the ruling get together, you would not have as good an at-
tendance as we have in here, not nearly, then I say the political
remedy did not appeal to Congress as being adequate, and that is
why they floundered around and tried to do something to provide
procedural safeguards and every time they tried it they had a
different party attempt to fill the bill and a different product
resulted. So you have all those laws and procedures.
Now, if we make the classification that where an administra-
tive act concerns people in their proprietary capacity, that is to
say, takes their property or their right to work away from them,
or where it affects so few people in their so-called public capacity
that as a matter of realism it affects only a private interest, then
I think that fairness demands that we must have some kind of an
impartial hearing to take the place of political remedies. But on
the other hand, wherever the political remedy is adequate, I think
it should be relied upon. The Executive Department should take
the praise or the blame. They should shoulder the responsibility
frankly and in each instance grant no more hearings or con-
ferences than they see fit and deem necessary in order to aid
them to carry on their responsibility.
Now, I would make two exceptions to the requirement of hear-
ings. If you have an emergency where the public good outweighs
the infringement of the liberty, or the property right, of indi-
viduals, then I vote for the public good, or for protection of the
public. And the second exception is where the matter to be de-
termined is so inconsequential that it would simply clutter up
things to have an elaborate procedure. Under those circum-
stances I see no need of a hearing.
Now, if we decide to have something like a court-and you see
1 am helping out by eliminating a vast class of cases in which
we won't even try to have that sort of thing-I say if we have a
court, let's not have a spurious court. A procedure in which one
employee of the Department of Agriculture sits as a judge and
another employee of the same department acts as a prosecutor
does not impress me with its sincerity. We had better go all the
way at once. Say rather that the department is charged with a
certain function and let them do it by means of an efficient pro-
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cedure. Then, if need be, have a separate reviewing body like
the Board of Tax Appeals. Where you have a board or tribunal
of that sort, you have substantial safeguards, although I guess
you people will agree it is not a court. It is more of a court than
some courts, but still it's not a court.
Now, coming to our own situation on the St. Louis Merchants'
Exchange, wherever there is any complaint that seems to be
sincere, whether well grounded or not, by any shipper to our mar-
ket, that any one of our members has done something he should
not have done, it is my advice to the committees and officers
of our exchange that the matter should be run to the ground.
We do that for two reasons. In the first place, it is sound busi-
ness. We shall pass that, because this symposium is not on busi-
ness methods. The second reason is that if we don't furnish such
a remedy, the Government must. It is a sort of insurance, a small
thing compared to court costs, and a small thing compared to
attorneys' fees. I am not at all impressed that such a complain-
ant should be told to go to court because he has all the rights
that began in the Magna Charta and have come on down. He
has the "right" to spend money to hire a lawyer to get justice.
That does not impress me. We either have to give the fellow a
square deal or have a tribunal in back of the market, the Depart-
ment of Agriculture, to see that it is done.
Well, now, everybody here this morning seems to have some
relative in the country, so I had a relative that was a farmer.
He used to ship to this market. After making a shipment he
would get on the train-this was before the day of automobiles.
He got here ahead of the cattle or grain as the case might be, and
if they said there was garlic in his wheat, he would say, "Let me
see it." If it was three and one half per cent, he wanted to see
that. If they said the wheat was moist, he wanted to see that. I
happen to have contact with a farm now, I am sorry to say. It
isn't necessary to get on the train, and you don't have to meet
your wheat in the market. Why don't you? Because you have
confidence in the inspection. And I say the credit for that is due
to the Department of Agriculture.
Now, one final thought and then I am through. I think Mr.
Gage made a wonderful presentation, starting with certain prem-
ises and leading up to a conclusion that probably is historically
grounded upon the Constitution and everything we revere, that
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we have to have a certain type of hearings. Well, I want to ask,
if there is a dangerous drug abroad in the land, or if there is a
cosmetic a woman uses which will mar or blind her, which is the
greater good-that these things shall be captured now, despite
alleged constitutional rights, or that we worship the Constitution
so much that three or four people die? These things have hap-
pened, and you people know it, on account of drugs. Other people
have been made blind, despite the fact that the Department of
Agriculture was trying to prevent it. They had a right to try to
capture those products, and I think that by all that is holy they
ought to retain that right, and if the Constitution doesn't mean
that, then let's change the Constitution.
by CLARENCE T. CASEi
When Professor Tyrrell Williams called me on the telephone
and asked me to take part in a symposium on administrative law,
I was somewhat puzzled. What kind of a symposium could it be?
By reference to my dictionary, I found that primarily a sym-
posium means a drinking party, a merrymaking, and as a prac-
ticing lawyer representing rugged individualists, I couldn't for
the life of me understand how any group of lawyers would want
to make merry over administrative law and its procedures. How-
ever, the encouragement I had gotten from the dictionary seemed
to hold out some promise until the next day when I received a
copy of the printed program. Then I felt a chill as if someone
had poured cold water down my spine, for there I found that the
master of ceremonies would be Missouri's most outstanding dry
leader-Charles M. Hay. My spirits rose again this morning
when I saw Roscoe Anderson as our presiding officer, but so far
nothing extraordinary has happened to enliven this sober occa-
sion.
As administrative law increases, the usefulness of the legal
profession in the great open field of business materially dimin-
ishes. With the delegation of judicial powers to administrative
boards, the prestige of our courts and our distinguished Bar
necessarily declines. The legal profession is on the way down
instead of on the way up. These new police courts in the Execu-
tive Department composed in many instances of a lay judiciary
follow police procedure generally. Rules of evidence are ignored,
- Member of St. Louis, Missouri, Bar.
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and practice before them is not confined exclusively to licensed
members of the Bar. Nearly all of them recognize various types
of lay practitioners and thereby reduce to a great extent the
appearances of licensed lawyers. There is ample precedent for
this in our federal statutes.
For many years the Patent Office has had its own exclusive
Bar composed of both lawyers and laymen legally designated as
"patent attorneys." Under the federal statutes, it provides its
own rules for admission to practice. A legal education is by no
means a necessary qualification. The same thing is true of the
Interstate Commerce Commission and the Department of Inter-
nal Revenue. There may be some others before whom I have not
yet obtained my licenses. At any rate, throughout all the admin-
istrative agencies performing judicial functions lay practitioners
are just as welcome, if not more so, than licensed lawyers.
I attended a dinner of manufacturers one evening at which
one of our leading tax accountants was the chief speaker. In
the course of his remarks he made the statement, "When you go
before the Internal Revenue Department on a tax matter, always
take your Certified Public Accountant, never take your lawyer.
If you take your lawyer, you will be immediately looked upon
with suspicion as having something to cover up, but with your
Certified Public Accountant, the Department official will feel that
you are ready to lay all your cards on the table and that your
purpose is an honest one, so that the employment of counsel is
not only a useless, but a hazardous expense." This statement
brought forth vociferous and hearty applause from everyone in
the audience. I say all-but one, because I was present.
It would seem therefore good advice to the young lawyers who
are about to leave this law school that, if they are at any time
lucky enough to represent some client before an administrative
agency, they ought to hide their diplomas and appear in some
other capacity.
It is not only from this standpoint alone that the usefulness of
the practicing lawyer is diminished, but many of these regulatory
agencies volunteer to give the citizen all necessary direction and
advice free of charge. These free legal aid bureaus promote
acquiescence and minimize court review. As a rule, administra-
tice agencies dislike court review.
The advent of these regulatory processes has so changed the
practise of the law in the business world that the most available
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opportunities for the young men leaving law school now lie in the
field of government service. Dean McClain, it might be well in
this law school to have a chair in practical politics.
The greatest difficulty confronting the lawyers with reference
to administrative law and its procedure is how can it be made to
fit due process of law. This splendid paper of Ashley Sellers
shows in what fine, la-wyer-like manner he has analyzed the vari-
ous functions of the Department of Agriculture, and how he is
attempting to make certain of them conform to an orderly ju-
dicial procedure. I am sincere when I say to you, sir, that you are
to be commended by all the Bar for your efforts.
The Constitution provides that no one shall be deprived of life,
liberty or property without due process of law. Many of us still
like to go back to the work of Justice Story and Judge Cooley as
authority on this subject. These distinguished authorities have
said due process of law means that no man shall be condemned
until he has had a fair and impartial hearing; that no property
shall be taken until the owner has had an opportunity to be
heard. There is only one exception to the rule, and that is where
the preservation of society or its protection requires immediate
and instantaneous destruction of individual rights and freedom
or private property. An example of the exception would be a
case where the immediate and instantaneous dynamiting of build-
ings is necessary to prevent the spreading of a conflagration.
Administrative law and procedure undertakes to govern itself
largely by the exception rather than the rule. Many of our legis-
lative enactments go to the extremes in their preambles and else-
where to set forth the existence of the conflagration which
necessitates violent and instantaneous action on the part of the
administrators. The purposes are frequently so expressed that
they must be effectuated regardless of individual rights and
property. Mr. Sellers has given us a broad picture of the many
responsibilities resting upon the Secretary of Agriculture. I
heartily sympathize with the Secretary's predicament, but the
courts have quite uniformly held that where Congress has dele-
gated rule-making power to or conferred judicial authority on
one man he alone must account for his stewardship. He cannot
shift the burden. This is perhaps the principal ruling in the
Morgan case. But that case goes further than that into the
realm of due process of law. The Court says: "If in an equity
case a special master or trial judge permitted the plaintiff's
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attorney to formulate the findings upon the evidence conferred
ex parte regarding them without affording an opportunity to his
opponent to know their contents and present objections there
would be no hesitation in setting aside the report or decree."
It is largely in this situation that lawyers representing private
citizens find themselves before administrative boards. After a
hearing has been held and evidence taken it may become con-
venient for the Department examiner to confer privately with
the Department investigators and obtain their private versions
on matters not fully disclosed in the testimony. This is most
likely where the Department is seeking a finding of bad faith.
Of course, Trial Examiners always protest that they want to
be fair, but I never appear before any of them that I am not
reminded of Earl Pirkey's dream about Sam McChesney.
To fully understand Earl's dream, you must know that Earl
has for many years been a "plaintiff's lawyer," trying a great
many cases against the Public Service Company, represented by
Sam. In these cases, Sam understands thoroughly what advan-
tage may be gained for the defendant by discrediting the plain-
tiff's witnesses. He has a trick of suddenly asking a witness some
question like this: "Were you ever in jail?" Of course, immedi-
ately plaintiff's counsel is on his feet with objections that the
question is immaterial. Then Sam, in his very quiet way, apolo-
gizes to the Court by withdrawing the question and saying, "I
just want to be fair, Your Honor, I just want to be fair."
It happened one morning that I met Earl shambling along and
I said to him, "How do you feel this morning, Earl?" and his
answer was, "Oh, I passed a miserable night! I had a nightmare.
I dreamed that I was about to be murdered. A man was standing
over my bed with a dagger in his hand. I could feel the sharp
point of the dagger at my left breast. In my agony, I screamed
and awoke and there I saw standing over me my would-be mur-
derer. It was Sam McChesney, saying, "I just want to be fair,
Your Honor, I just want to be fair." My allotted time is about
up, and I must cease my merrymaking.
When the decision in the Schchter case was handed down
declaring the National Recovery Act unconstitutional, Senator
Borah, who has now passed on to his reward, was reported by
the Press to have uttered these words--"God bless the Courts"
-I say, "God bless the law students." May they all ultimately
find surcease from sorrow in administrative law and procedure.
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